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Recent double digit billion dollar mergers of telecommunications firms consolidate both 
market share and market leadership by incumbent operators such as Verizon. These companies 
seek to exploit technological and market convergence by offering a triple play package of wired 
and wireless telephone service, video and Internet access. As well they need to develop new 
profit centers to compensate for declining revenues and market shares in traditional services such 
as wireline telephony.  
While incumbent telecommunications operators have pursued new market opportunities, 
these ventures have not abandoned core management philosophies, operating assumptions and 
business strategies. Longstanding strategies for recovering investments, using a 
telecommunications template greatly contrast with the means by which information processing 
and content providers achieve profitability. Internet ventures have come up with many different 
business models including ones that offer free, subsidized or deliberately underpriced access as 
well as regularly increasing value propositions to consumers, e.g., more options for the same 
price. Incumbent telecommunications firms rarely deviate from a rigid cost recovery structure 
that identifies cost causers.  
Internet and telecommunications business models rarely jibe, even though convergence 
and business transactions puts incumbent telecommunications firms in market leadership 
2positions. Having such dominant market share now makes it likely that incumbent 
telecommunications firms will attempt to imprint their business models and their mindsets on 
Internet markets. Recently senior managers of several incumbent carriers have expressed 
displeasure with the apparent inability of their companies to recover the sizable investment in 
broadband Internet access. With an eye toward recouping these investments, the companies have 
announced plans to replace, or offer alternatives to unmetered All You Can Eat Internet access 
and to oppose any initiative that restrains their pricing and operational flexibility.  
The incumbent telecommunications companies characterize their new Internet pricing 
plans as offering “greater choice” to consumers. Different pricing points based on throughput 
caps makes sense to a “Bellhead” corporate officer who thinks he or she can identify cost causers 
and capture rents that otherwise would accrue to content providers. However, the Internet 
seamlessly blends content and conduit, making it difficult to identify the cost causer.  
This article will examine Bellhead business models incorporating metering and other 
traditional cost recovery strategies with an eye toward determining what constitutes reasonable 
price discrimination and what represents an unfair trade practice or an anticompetitive strategy. 
The article will consider whether and how Bellhead management strategies will jeopardize the 
serendipity and positive networking externalities that have accrued when users can freely “surf 
the web” and content providers can bundle user sought content with advertising. Different 
pricing points based on throughput caps makes sense to Bellhead corporate officers who think 
they can capture rents that otherwise would accrue to content providers.  
The article also will examine the clash of Bellhead and Nethead cultures with an eye 
toward identifying the stakes involved when Internet access pricing and interconnection 
primarily follows a telecommunications infrastructure cost recovery scheme in lieu of different 
3commercial relationships favored by most Internet ventures. The article concludes that most 
Bellhead cost recovery models are lawful even though they will reduce for most consumers the 
real or perceived value proposition offered by an unmetered monthly Internet access 
subscription. 
 
Converging technologies and markets pose major challenges to incumbent 
telecommunications 1 companies and national regulatory authorities (“NRAs”).  Packet switched 
networking can provide a single, but versatile medium for the delivery of many information, 
communications and entertainment (“ICE”) services.   Most NRAs have only begun to revamp 
the nature and type of regulation in light of changed circumstances.  Generally NRAs have 
streamlined telecommunications service regulation in light of actual or prospective competition.  
These regulators have refrained from subjecting Internet-carried, information services 2 to 
significant government oversight. 
 
1 Telecommunications is defined as “the transmission, between or among points specified 
by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the 
information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(43).  Telecommunications service means “the 
offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be 
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(46). 
The Communications Act defines telecommunications carrier as “any provider of 
telecommunications services, except that such term does not include aggregators of 
telecommunications services (as defined in section 226).  A telecommunications carrier shall be 
treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing 
telecommunications services, except that the Commission shall determine whether the provision 
of fixed and mobile satellite service shall be treated as common carriage.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(44). 
 
2 Information service is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, 
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such 
capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the 
management of a telecommunications service.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).  “[T]he language and 
legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996] indicate that the drafters . . . regarded 
4Core telecommunications service revenue streams, such as that provided by basic 
wireline telephone services, have declined 3 as increasing numbers of subscribers migrate to new 
options provided by wireless carriers, 4 cable 5 television companies and Voice over the Internet 
Protocol (“VoIP”) ventures. 6 Understandably incumbent carriers have undertaken a major 
 
telecommunications services and information services as mutually exclusive categories.”  
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11522 
(1998); see also Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp.2d at 994, 1000 (applying the FCC’s 
dichotomy). 
 
3 The FCC reports that in 2004 local exchange telecommunications revenues in the United 
States declined to $85.92 billion from $86.474 billion in the preceding year with toll services 
declining from $58.983 to $50.557 billion in the same period. Federal Communications 
Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Trends 
in Telephone Service, Table 15.1 Telecommunications Industry Revenues, 15-3 (2005);available 
at: 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/trend605.pdf.
4 The FCC reports that in 2004 local wireless revenues increased from $85.254 billion to 
$95.503 billion in the previous year. Id.
5 Cable service is defined as: (A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video 
programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is 
required for the selection or use of such video programming or other programming service. 47 
U.S.C. § 522(6). 
 
6 Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) refers to the use of the Internet to carry and 
deliver on a real time, immediate basis packets of data that correspond to a voice conversation. 
VoIP services range in quality, reliability and price and can link both computers and ordinary 
telephone handsets.   For technical background on how VoIP works see Intel, White Paper, IP 
Telephony Basics, available at 
http://www.intel.com/network/csp/resources/white_papers/4070web.htm; Susan Spradley and 
Alan Stoddard,  Tutorial on Technical Challenges Associated with the Evolution to VoIP, Power 
Point Presentation, available at: http://www.fcc.gov/oet/tutorial/9-22-03_voip-
final_slides_only.ppt. See also, R. Alex DuFour, Voice Over Internet Protocol: Ending 
Uncertainty and Promoting Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMLCON 471 
(2005); Stephen E. Blythe, The Regulation of Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol in the United States, 
the European Union, and the United Kingdom, 5 J. High Tech. L. 161(2005).  
 In a short span of time VoIP has evolved from a low quality hobby of computer 
enthusiasts, who used the Internet as a medium to provide voice communications between 
computers, to a near equivalent to conventional dial up telephone service.  VoIP provides 
5campaign seeking regulatory relief that would remove real or perceived disincentives for new 
investment in replacement lines of business 7and to establish parity with unregulated ventures 
that offer competitive services. 8
In light of the financial stakes involved in the scope of regulation applied to conventional,  
 
consumers with access to lower cost services, because of technological efficiency in the use of 
the Internet’s packet switched architecture and reduced regulation imposed costs. Some VoIP 
service providers can avoid paying access charges to local exchange carriers and making USF 
contributions. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com’s Free World Dialup is 
Neither Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, Docket No. 03-45, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 3307 (2004). 
 
7 The International Telecommunication Union reported that as of January 1, 2005 the 
United States ranked 16th in broadband penetration measured in terms of number of subscribers 
per 100 inhabitants.  See International Telecommunications Union, ITU Strategy and Policy Unit 
Newsblog; available at: 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/ITUs+New+Broadband+Statistics+For+1+January+2005.asp
x. See Rob Frieden, Lessons From Broadband Development in Canada, Japan, Korea and the 
United States, 29 TELECOM POL’Y., No. 8, 595-613 (Sept. 2005). 
Regulatory uncertainty and the overlay of existing telecommunications regulation may 
have created disincentives for incumbent carriers to invest in broadband plant.  On the other 
hand, regardless of a real or perceived regulatory burden, incumbent carriers probably can no 
longer rely on wireline services as the primary source of revenue.   
 
8 “The existing regulatory framework was built around the concept that different services 
were provided by different providers, without overlap.  Thus, telephone companies providing 
telephone service are regulated as common carriers under Title II of the Communications Act of 
1934 . . ..  But, to the extent that [other] wireline networks can deliver the same services to the 
consumer at the same quality, it is difficult to understand why different technologies should 
trigger different regulatory treatment for the same services.”   Antonia M. Apps & Thomas M. 
Dailey, Non-Regulation of Advanced Internet Services, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 681, 682-683 
(Summer 2000); see also, Rob Frieden, The FCC’s Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory 
Classifications Affect Competition, 19 BERKLEY TECH. L. J., No. 4, 1275-1314 (Fall, 2004); 
Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J. L.& 
TECH., No. 2, 227-275 (2004); available at: 
http://www.jolt.unc.edu/Vol5_I2/pdf/Frieden%20v5i2.pdf. Rob Frieden, Adjusting the 
Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional 
and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J., No. 2, 207-250 (March, 2003). 
 
6so-called legacy services and new information services, 9 numerous organizations 10 have pursued 
a public policy agenda supporting deregulation and the eradication of government oversight, 
including traditional regulatory over pricing, interconnection and quality of service. 11 These 
 
9 “Initial telecommunications regulatory reform has also been marked by regulatory 
arbitrage, whereby network carriers would seek to take advantage of inconsistent 
telecommunications regulations to sustain their businesses. Examples of early regulatory 
arbitrage include international callback routines designed to take advantage of excessive 
international accounting rates, and bypass facilities of Competitive Access Providers - competing 
local exchange carriers, designed to avoid local exchange access charges. Recent examples of 
regulatory arbitrage include IP telephony services designed to avoid universal service charges, 
and reciprocal compensation terminating fees for terminating calls to Internet Service Providers, 
designed to take advantage of the alleged local nature of Internet traffic. Such regulatory 
arbitraging has been tacitly approved by regulatory authorities, to encourage certain social policy 
agendas and to avoid political obstacles that have favored existing monopoly network 
infrastructures.” Benjamin Lipschitz, Opportunities and Challenges in the Digital Era, 7-FALL 
MEDIA L. & POL’Y 14, 20 (Fall 1998). 
 
10 See, e.g., The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Net Neutrality and Net Neutering in a 
Post-Brand X World: Self-Regulation, Policy, Principles and Legal Mandates in the Broadband 
Marketplace, Release 12.29 (Dec. 2005); available at: http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/pop12.29netneutrality.pdf; National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Phone 
Companies and the Truth: A Bad Connection (March 14, 2006)(identifying several “astro turf” 
consumer and academic organizations claiming independence despite serving as paid 
mouthpieces); available at: http://www.ncta.com/pdf_files/Bells_Misleading_America.pdf.
11 See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC 
Rcd. 14,853 (2005) available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-
150A1.doc (reclassifying DSL from a common carrier provided telecommunications service to a 
largely unregulated information service).  Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98- 147, Report and Order and 
Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978 (2003), 
corrected by Errata, 18 FCC Rcd 19020 (2003), partially vacated and sub nom., United States 
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (USTA II), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 313, 
Order on Reconsideration, 19 FCC Rcd. 15,856 (2004), Further Reconsideration, 19 FCC Rcd. 
20,293 (2004) (Triennial Review FTTC Reconsideration Order). In response to the D.C. 
Circuit’s vacatur of certain Triennial Review Order unbundling rules, the FCC issued an Interim 
Order and NPRM, setting forth a six-month interim unbundling framework with respect to those 
network elements, and seeking comment on permanent unbundling rules that would respond to 
7groups reject any view that even as telecommunications becomes less regulated, a new concept 
of “network neutrality” 12 should force largely unregulated Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to 
forego the option of offering differentiated and tiered Internet services.  Opponents of net 
neutrality view the concept as jeopardizing operational and pricing flexibility.  Net neutrality 
advocates fervently argue that the Internet cannot achieve maximum contributions to national 
productivity, economic opportunity and innovation unless government ensures end-to-end 
connectivity by foreclosing a balkanized, or tiered Internet. 13 
the USTA II decision. Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the Section 251 
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 04-313, CC 
Docket No. 01-338, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 16,783 (2004); 
Order on Remand, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533 (2005). 
 
12 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOM & 
HIGH TECH L. 141 (2005); available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=388863; Barbara van 
Schewick, Towards and Economic Framework for Economic Neutrality, paper presented at the 
33nd annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Arlington, Va. (2005); available 
at: 
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/483/van%20Schewick%20Network%20Neutrality%20
TPRC%202005.pdf; Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving 
the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925 (2001). 
 
13 See, e.g., United States Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 
Prepared Statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc. 
available at: http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1705&wit_id=4958.
“The Internet’s open, neutral architecture has proven to be an enormous engine for market 
innovation, economic growth, social discourse , and the free flow of ideas.  The remarkable 
success of the Internet can be traced to a few simple network principles—end-to-end design, 
layered architecture, and open standards—which together give consumers choice and control 
over their online activities.”  For background on a revised regulatory regime that applies 
different degrees of government oversight based on the scope of competition in each layer of 
service that blends telecommunications packet delivery with intelligent networking , software 
applications and content see Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New 
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 587 (May, 2004); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper 
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 
561 (2000); Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the United States of the European Union’s 
Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications, Federal Communications 
8In tandem with efforts to shape public policy and public opinion, incumbent carriers have 
recognized that declining revenue prospects for traditional, core service require changed business 
plans and strategies.  Incumbent telephone companies now see upside financial opportunities in 
providing broadband Internet access, video services and VoIP singularly and as a bundle of 
services commonly referred to as the “triple- or quadruple play.” 14 Incumbents’ responsiveness 
to consumers’ wants, needs and desires and the willingness to embrace change comes across as a 
refreshing change to the “Bellhead” 15 caricature of a corporate mindset lacking creativity, 
entrepreneurship and marketing acumen. 
 
Commission, Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper Series No. 36 (July, 2002); available at: 
http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html; Douglas Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for 
Telecommunications Policy (2002); unpublished paper available at: 
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf; Kevin Werbach, A
Layers Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L., 37 (2002); John T. 
Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Regulation From the 
Bottom Up, 1 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L., 95 (2002); Phillip J. Weiser, Law and 
Information Platforms, J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L., 1 (2002); Craig McTaggert, A
Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis (Dec. 21, 2002); available at 
http://www.innovationlaw.org/cm/ilg2002/reading/layered1.pdf; Robert Cannon, The Legacy of 
the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167 
(2003); Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: 
A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207 
(2003). 
 
14 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, It’s Not Enough to Be Just a Phone Company, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, ,  Sec. C, p. 1 (February 19, 2004); available at: http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=fc005e879bfda64a00009c618b294e7c&_docnum=17&wchp
=dGLbVzz-zSkVb&_md5=88b9da3c07b1da868d15202176609ba6.
15 Bellhead has been defined as a “person involved with telephone networks or someone 
who thinks about networking from a circuit-switched point of view.” PC Magazine 
Encyclopedia, available at: 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Bellhead&i=38536,00.asp.
For background on the Bellhead and Nethead orientation see Rob Frieden, Revenge of the 
Bellheads: How the Netheads Lost Control of the Internet, 26 TELECOM. POL’Y, No. 6, 125-
144 (Sep./Oct. 2002). 
 
9However, the Bellhead mindset may not have perished entirely as senior incumbent 
carrier managers have gone public with provocative statements about net neutrality that represent 
longstanding management philosophies, operating assumptions and business strategies fashioned 
when the incumbent carriers primarily provided voice telephony.  As well recent double digit 
billion dollar mergers of incumbent telecommunications firms evidence a keen interest in buying 
out competition in addition to investing in innovations and new facilities. 16 Notwithstanding 
substantial technological and market convergence that will force new strategies, the senior 
managers of AT&T, BellSouth and Verizon have expressed rather rigid traditionalist views on 
their companies’ role in content delivery, and how these companies will price service, 
interconnect facilities and recover costs.  
 Even in an environment where data transmission and the Internet increasingly dominate 
incumbent carrier managers still appear to shape business strategies based on the expectation that 
they can continue to make major operational and business decisions based on the status quo.  
When operating networks primarily transmitted, switched and routed voice telephone calls, an 
incumbent carrier could identify who caused the carrier to incur costs, where traffic originated 
and terminated and what volume of traffic a subscriber generated, and had responsibility for 
payment.  When an Internet-centric network dominates, carriers have far less ability to track cost 
causers, particularly because content and conduit converge and a number of different business 
factors contribute to the generation of traffic, including advertiser added content whose reception 
by consumers pays for the creation and delivery of desired content.  
 
16 Major mergers and acquisitions in the United States telecommunications marketplace 
include AT&T’s acquisition of TCI, one of the nation’s largest cable television ventures, 
Verizon’s merger with MCI, SBC’s mergers with Pacific Telesis, Ameritech and AT&T and its 
proposed merger with BellSouth.  
10
Consumers look to Internet access as a seamless collection of telecommunications 
capability, i.e., high speed bit transport, and access to content.  Additionally Internet traffic flows 
have both bursty and asymmetric characteristics unlike voice telephony.  Consumers require 
broadband connections capable of handling substantial data volumes on an episodic, not 
continuous basis.  The Internet’s asymmetrical nature refers to the fact that much of the 
broadband connectivity consumers require flows downstream from a content source to a 
consumer.  A narrowband, upstream request for content can trigger a wideband download of the 
content bundled with an additional payload of commercial advertising.  Heretofore, Internet 
traffic routing has not readily satisfied the Bellhead desire to designate particular carriers and 
routes to meter usage for each and every data session. 
 Faced with ever increasing bandwidth requirements, incumbent carriers have resurrected 
a decidedly Bellhead notion that they should implement technological innovations that can 
“sniff” and meter Internet traffic and thereby identify cost causers with greater specificity.  
Innovations in packet prioritization may help incumbent carriers achieve this objective, but such 
technologies have not yet become commonly available.  More fundamentally competitive 
necessity and preexisting operational and pricing strategies militate against such metering.  
When they first introduced Internet services, the incumbent carriers recognized that a 
predominant  
“Nethead”17 culture coupled with technological limitations foreclosed the simple extension of 
voice telephony pricing, interconnection and cost recovery techniques.   
 
17 A Nethead has been defined as a “person who has a passion for the Internet, [or one] 




Recently senior managers of incumbent carriers have signaled their intent to meter and 
tier Internet services.   AT&T Chairman Ed Whitacre has colorfully expressed indignation that 
current standard procedure for Internet pricing and interconnection has left his company 
burdened with having to create, maintain and frequently upgrade an expensive bit transport 
infrastructure while content firms, such as Google, allegedly get a free ride: 
Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them 
do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.  So 
there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes 
to pay for the portion they’re using.  Why should they be allowed to use my 
pipes?  The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable 
companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or 
anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts! 18 
In a Bellhead-managed, voice telephony environment, a telephone company has the 
ability to meter a specific customer’s traffic and to bill for carrying that traffic on a metered or 
flat-rate.  With rare exception a telephone company only handles traffic for which it can expect 
to receive compensation from either the call originator, or the call recipient.  The Bellhead model 
for managing traffic and recovering costs has a route-specific focus with comprehensive 
tracking, usage metering and cost accounting. 
In a Nethead-managed Internet environment, carriers interconnect their networks 
seamlessly and build cooperative relationships designed to achieve global network connectivity.  
The Internet operates as a “network of networks” 19 and offers users access to content regardless 
 
18 At SBC, It’s All About “Scale and Scope,” BUSINESSWEEK, ONLINE EXTRA 
November 7, 2005. 
 
19 “The idea of a computer network intended to allow general communication between users 
of various computers has developed through a large number of stages. The melting pot of 
developments brought together the network of networks that we know as the Internet.” 
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of location.  ISPs readily interconnect their networks with an eye toward acquiring access to 
other carriers’ networks for payment, or in exchange for providing reciprocal access on a zero 
payment basis.  Accordingly, content generated by Google and sought by an AT&T broadband 
service customer arrives at the final destination via AT&T lines, but quite likely have transited 
the facilities of other ISPs upstream from AT&T.  With the revenues accruing from providing 
broadband access, AT&T either pays for upstream access to other ISPs’ networks, a transaction 
known as transiting, or AT&T negotiates a reciprocal peering relation with other ISPs whereby 
the parties voluntarily agree to exchange traffic, often without funds transferring between the 
carriers.  Google is no more a free rider of AT&T networks than AT&T and its subscribers 
would be when content originates on an AT&T network, but must travel across the networks of 
other ISPs, with which AT&T has a transiting or peering agreement, to reach a recipient who 
subscribes to an ISP unaffiliated with AT&T.  
 The fact that incumbent carrier executives have gained traction with the view that content 
providers enjoys a free ride underscores the ability to obscure how Internet traffic traverses 
networks and how ISPs manage and pay for such networking.  As well it may foreshadow an 
aggressive campaign by carriers such as AT&T and Verizon to change the fundamental terms 
and conditions under which consumers access Internet content.  Internet ventures have come up 
with many different business models to recoup and profit from investments, including the offer 
of free, subsidized or deliberately underpriced access to content.  Internet ventures also may 
sweeten the deal, by increasing the value propositions of a service, i.e., providing more options 
for free, or at a subsidized price.  Keen on identifying and charging cost causers, incumbent 
 
Wikipedia, History of the Internet; available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Internet.
13
telecommunications companies may want to alter and reduce the value proposition enjoyed by 
Internet consumers, particularly ones who consume the most, e.g., video file downloaders, and 
who currently access the Internet on an “all you can eat” (“AYCE”) unmetered monthly 
subscription. 
This article will examine Bellhead business models incorporating metering and other 
traditional cost recovery strategies with an eye toward determining what constitutes reasonable 
price discrimination and what represents an unfair trade practice or an anticompetitive strategy.  
The article will consider whether and how Bellhead management strategies will jeopardize the 
serendipity and positive networking externalities 20 that have accrued when users can freely “surf 
the web” and content providers can bundle user sought content with advertising.  Different 
pricing points based on throughput caps makes sense to Bellhead corporate officers who think 
they can capture rents that otherwise would accrue to content providers.   
The article also will examine the clash of Bellhead and Nethead cultures with an eye 
toward identifying the stakes involved when Internet access pricing and interconnection 
primarily follows a telecommunications infrastructure cost recovery scheme in lieu of different 
commercial relationships favored by most Internet ventures.  The article concludes that most  
Bellhead cost recovery models are lawful even though they will reduce for most consumers the 
real or perceived value proposition offered by an unmetered monthly Internet access 
subscription.   
 
20 A positive network externality exists when the cost incurred by a user of the Internet does 
not fully reflect the benefit derived with the addition of new users and points of communications. 
See John Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. 
OF ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). See also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, 
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). 
14
Traditional Interconnection and Cost Recovery Models 
 To appreciate the significance of recent initiatives to change Internet pricing, 
interconnection and quality of service conventions, one should consider the traditional models 
used by telecommunications carriers and ISPs in telephony and the Internet respectively.  
Bellhead and Nethead philosophies play a significant role in shaping interconnection terms and 
conditions.   
Telecommunications Settlements 
Telecommunications carriers have established interconnection and cost recovery models 
based on a network architecture designed to provide voice telephone circuit via a neutral conduit 
for the content generated by others.  In a nutshell telecommunications carriers closely track 
network usage, establish direct contractual commitments with all carriers whose traffic traverses 
a network, and expect compensation for each unit of traffic handled.  For international traffic 
telecommunications carriers typically “match” international half-circuits and financially “settle” 
accounts using a fixed per minute accounting rate 21 that attributes a negotiated financial value 
for each minute of traffic.   
 
21 For background on the international accounting rate system, see Paul W. Kenefick, A Step 
in the Right Direction: The FCC Provides Regulatory Relief in International Settlements and 
International Services Licensing, 8 COMLCON 43 (2000); Rob Frieden, MANAGING 
INTERNET-DRIVEN CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ch. 9.1 
(2001); Robert M. Frieden, Falling Through the Cracks: International Accounting Rate Reform 
at the ITU and WTO, 22 TELECOM POL’Y, 963, 963-75 (1998) (describing how heightened 
attention to international calling rates at the ITU and WTO has led some observers to conclude 
that carriers soon will impose cost-based termination charges).  Rob Frieden, Robert M., Last 
Days of the Free Ride?  The Consequences of Settlement-Based Interconnection for the Internet,
1 INFO., No. 3, 225-238 (June, 1999).   
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Ironically the telephony model currently operates comparatively on a less hierarchical 
and more democratic basis than the Internet model.  For example, each and every United States 
long distance carrier seeking to provide directly routed telephone calling to any foreign country 
generally can establish an operating agreement directly with one or more foreign carriers.  Until 
a few years ago, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) policies required all U.S. 
carriers, regardless of traffic volume, capitalization and global presence, to apply the same 
financial terms and conditions when settling accounts with foreign carriers. 22 For domestic 
traffic carriers typically apply multi-element access charges for the use of facilities to originate 
and terminate traffic. 23 Some of the charges are usage based and others are flat rated, because 
the cost does not vary with usage.  
 
22 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Reform of the International Settlements Policy and 
Associated Filing Requirements, IB Docket No. 98-148, Report and Order and Order on 
Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd. 7963 (1999); Policy Statement on International Accounting Rate 
Reform, 11 FCC Rcd. 3146, 3146 (1996) (stating intent to update accounting rate policies to 
encourage competition and technological innovation); International Settlement Rates, IB Docket 
No. 96-261, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806, 19891, 19894 (1997) (creating four 
transition periods for compliance with benchmarks and responding to the potential for expanded 
opportunities for one-way bypass of an accounting rate settlement created by the Basic 
Telecommunications Service Agreement); Regulation of International Accounting Rates, CC 
Docket No. 90-337, Phase II, Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20063, 20083, 20094 
(1996) (permitting carriers to negotiate alternatives to the traditional settlement rate system for 
routes where effective competitive opportunities exist for U.S. carriers); 1998 Biennial 
Regulatory Reviews Reform of International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing 
Requirements, IB Docket No. 98-148, 13 FCC Rcd. 15320 (1998) (proposing largely to abandon 
accounting rate scrutiny for traffic to World Trade Organization Member nations); International 
Settlements Policy Reform; International Settlement Rates, IB Docket Nos. 02-324, 96-261, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 19954 (2002), First Report and Order, 19 FCC 
Rcd. 5709 (2004). 
 
23 Interstate access charges are imposed by local exchange carriers (“LECs”) to recover the 
costs of providing access to their networks for interstate and long-distance service. The FCC 
seeks to promote the filing of access charges that recover costs from the class of consumers that 
have caused the LEC to incur such costs. In particular, non-traffic-sensitive costs-costs that do 
16
In the Bellhead world each and every carrier secures permission to use another carrier’s 
network for compensation on a highly calibrated and typically metered basis.  A well-calibrated 
cost recovery mechanism applies anytime and anywhere one carrier hands off traffic to another 
carrier.  Carrier “correspondents,” of any size and traffic volume, secure direct interconnection of 
networks or indirect transiting via the network of a third carrier.  In the traditional 
telecommunications model, carriers can readily track traffic routes and meter traffic streams.  
With such specificity carriers can easily meter traffic and determine whether a carrier should 
receive payment for switching, routing and transporting more traffic than the carrier handed off 
to another carrier.    
ISP Peering and Transiting  
In the Nethead world ISPs typically use less calibrated measures of traffic flow and also 
have a far greater number of cost recovery options available for negotiation.  ISPs traditionally 
have established looser interconnection arrangements that may not even meter traffic flows, and 
which emphasize the accessibility of bandwidth, number of interconnection locations, diversity 
of available routes and  availability of personnel.  They can secure access to the entire, global 
 
not vary with the amount of traffic carried over the facilities-should be recovered through flat-
rate charges, and traffic-sensitive costs should be recovered through per-minute charges. This 
approach fosters competition and efficient pricing. The Part 69 rules of the FCC Rules and 
Regulations, 47 C.F.R. Pt. 69 (2005), governing access charges, codifies this strategy. See 
Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Transport 
Rate Structure and Pricing, and End User Common Line Charges, First Report and Order, 12 
FCC Rcd. 15,982, paras. 344-48 (1997), aff’d Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 
(8th Cir. 1998); Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange 
Carriers, Low-Volume Long-Distance Users, Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 
Sixth Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 12962 (2000); Developing a Unified Intercarrier 
Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd. 9610 (2001). 
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Internet cloud often by securing a direct contractual arrangement with a few ISPs who in turn 
have acquired other interconnection arrangements with many other smaller ISPs.   
 ISPs initially used a similarly democratic model during the early days of the Internet.  At 
that time, just about all ISPs agreed to peer with any other ISP on a settlement free, “Sender 
Keep All” 24 peering 25 arrangement with no transfer of funds, or a transit arrangement where 
one ISP pays to acquire access to another ISP’s network and its customers as well as access to 
other ISPs’ networks.  As government incubators and anchor tenants sought to privatize the 
 
24 “In a bill-and-keep or sender-keeps-all arrangement, each carrier bills its own customers 
for the origination of traffic and does not pay the other carrier for terminating this traffic. In a 
settlement arrangement, on the other hand, the carrier on which the traffic originates pays the 
other carrier to terminate the traffic. If traffic flow between the two networks is balanced, the net 
settlement that each pays is zero, and therefore a bill-and-keep arrangement may be preferred 
because the networks do not have to incur costs to measure and track traffic or to develop billing 
systems. As an example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 allows for incumbent local 
exchange carriers to exchange traffic with competitors using a bill-and-keep arrangement.” 
Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 COMLCON 45, 
n.60 (2003) (citing 47 U.S.C. §252 (d)(2)(B)(i) (2000)). “The sharing of traffic over the 
interconnected networks forming the Internet on a statistical and un-metered ‘settlements’ (or 
‘bill & keep’) basis was a hallmark of early federal agency involvement in the development of 
the Internet. This system of traffic carriage free of charge became known as ‘peering.’” Barbara 
Esbin, INTERNET OVER CABLE: DEFINING THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF THE PAST 20 
(F.C.C., O.P.P. Working Paper No. 30, 1998), available at 1998 WL 567433. 
 
25 For background on the economics and logistics of peering, see Geoff Huston, Where’s 
the Money?—Internet Interconnection and Financial Settlements (Jan. 2005); available at: 
http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2005-01/; Steve Gibbard, Economics of Peering (Oct. 2004); 
available at: http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/Gibbard-peering-economics.pdf; Daniel C.H. 
Mah, Explaining Internet Connectivity: Voluntary Interconnection Among Commercial Internet 
Service Providers (March 26, 2003); available at: 
http://tprc.org/papers/2003/181/Explaining_Internet_Connectivity_Mar26-03.DOC.pdf;
William B. Norton, A Business Case for ISP Peering, Draft 1.3 (Feb. 19 2002); available at: 
http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/Business_case.pdf; Jean-Jacques Laffont; Scott 
Marcus; Patrick Rey; Jean Tirole, Interconnection and Access in Telecom and the Internet, 91
AMER. ECON. REV., No. 2, 287-291 (May, 2001); Bill Woodcock, White Paper on 
Transactions and Valuation Associated with Inter-Carrier Routing of Internet Protocol Traffic,
or BGP for Bankers, (Aug. 2000); available at: http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/routing-
economics/pch-routing-economics.htm.
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Internet, interconnection became less democratic and more hierarchical. 26 Currently only the 
largest, Tier-1 ISPs agree to peering, with smaller ISPs, having fewer customers, available 
routes, bandwidth and interconnection points, having to pay to interconnect and use the networks 
of the Tier-1 ISPs.   
Even as smaller ISPs now have to pay for network access, the Nethead credo of 
promoting global connectivity continues.  Theoretically a small ISP in a most remote location 
can provide its customers access to just about any ISP and any source, or recipient of content 
simply by securing a transit agreement with one ISP higher up the hierarchy.  This ISP, located 
upstream from the smaller ISP, typically can “advertise” routes, i.e., offer transit access to other 
ISPs’ networks, sufficient to secure global access to the smaller ISP’s subscribers.  The brilliance 
in the Internet ISP relationship lies in the positive networking externalities achieved through 
global connectivity. 
The specificity in routing and destinations in telecommunication access arrangements 
largely eliminates any opportunity for free rides, or underpayment by a carrier.  In Internet 
access arrangements even with the elimination of peering opportunities, some operators can 
exploit transit and other routing agreements at least in the short run.  If an ISP does not bear 
much risk in providing qualitatively inferior service it can exploit access to other ISPs’ networks 
sooner and more extensively.  The concept of “hot potato routing” 27 refers to an ISP’s decision 
 
26 See Rob Frieden, Does a Hierarchical Internet Necessitate Multilateral Intervention? 26
N.C. J. INT’L & COM. REG., No. 2, 361-405 (Spring, 2001). 
 
27 “Rather than lease lines throughout the nation and expand capacity, the free rider ISP 
may attempt to hand off traffic to a larger, better equipped ISP at the closest public peering point. 
The free rider ISP considers traffic a ‘hot potato’ and has a financial incentive to pass such traffic 
off to any other ISP who agrees to take it.” Rob Frieden, Without Public Peer: the Potential 
Regulatory and Universal Service Consequences of Internet Balkanization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
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to hand off traffic to another ISP closer to the service territory of the handing off ISP.  
Presumably the quick hand off to another operator reduces the handing off ISP’s costs and makes 
fuller use of transit opportunities.   
Despite significant efforts to streamline regulation telecommunications carriers’ cost 
recovery strategies and tactics face still significant government oversight.  In contrast ISPs 
typically negotiate contracts subject to non-disclosure agreements making it quite difficult to 
determine the actual terms and conditions the parties will use.  Telecommunications settlements 
offer a generally transparent process among equals with money flowing from one carrier to the 
other based almost exclusively on traffic flows.  Few ISPs now peer on a zero cost basis and the 
flow of funds depends on a number of factors in addition to traffic flows, including location of 
the ISP. 
While ISPs do not ignore the cost of doing business, they pursue a cooperative routing 
arrangement often based on a less than scientific “rough justice” estimate of whether a carrier 
offers switching, routing and bit transport services equivalent to what it receives. ISPs in remote 
areas, including most developing countries, bear the entire financial burden to access larger ISP 
networks, often via expensive international satellite links.  In a worse case scenario an ISP in a 
developing country lacks access to a local or regional facility for the exchange of traffic thereby 
requiring transit via distant ISP facilities even for the delivery of local traffic.  Having to self-
provision telecommunications line access to other ISPs and the possibility of “tromboning,” via 
 
8, P 2 n.2 (1998); see also Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet 
Backbones, 11 COMLCON 45, 60 (2003). 
 
20
distant ISP facilities even for local traffic, juxtaposes with the greater uniformity and equality in 
telecommunications cost sharing.  28
One key way to reduce Internet traffic costs lies in the installation of local or regional 
facilities that link many ISPs and their separate networks.  Such Internet Exchange Points 
(“IXPs”) make it possible for each participating ISP to exploit better the Internet’s “network of 
networks” synergy, i.e., the opportunity for an ISP to hand off traffic for carriage by other ISPs 
instead of having to engineer a longer, possibly circuitous route.   ISPs interconnect networks at 
IXPs, because individually and collectively they can reduce their bandwidth and line 
transmission costs, provide more reliable service with less time of service delays (latency) and 
operate more efficiently.   
IXPs provide a centralized hub and spoke network typology instead of requiring each 
ISP, regardless of size, traffic volume and capitalization, to erect a mesh network covering the 
globe.  Because the Internet offers access to content and users anywhere, each ISP has to secure 
network connections to all potential recipients of content and senders of content, or 
competitively suffer for the lack of global reach.   Reciprocal interconnection—whether freely 
provisioned or provided for a fee—makes it possible for an ISP to access the entire global 
 
28 “Without an IXP, ISPs have to pay international bandwidth prices for traffic that is 
actually destined locally within a particular country.  In most cases the traffic travel overseas 
through two satellite hops before it reaches its destination a few kilometers across a city.  With 
an IXP present within a country, each ISP pays HALF the cost to reach each of the other ISPs, 
since they all meet at a neutral point in the middle.” African Internet Service Providers 
Association, “The Halfway Proposition” Background Paper on reverse subsidy of G8 countries 
by African ISPs, p. 4, presented at the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development, Johannesburg, South Africa Oct. 19, 2002; available at: 
http://afrispa.skybuilders.com/.
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Internet cloud for its subscribers and thereby to accrue increasing value from the Internet, 
because its utility and value increase with the number of accessible points of communications. 
ISPs operating without the benefit of a local or even regional IXP bear the financial 
burden of having to secure links with the largest and most desirable Tier-1 ISP networks at a 
location at their own expense possibly thousands of miles distant, on terms primarily established 
by the larger ISP.  Remotely located ISPs and ones with comparatively fewer subscribers, 
networking options and content options must procure expensive telecommunications links, 
including one or more satellite hops, or a long submarine cable link to route traffic to and from 
an ISP leasing transit access to networks and content throughout the world.  Because ISPs do not 
split operating costs in half, like the telecommunications half-circuit settlements process, smaller 
and remotely located ISPs must unilaterally pay for the complete telecommunications links to 
ISPs willing to provide interconnection services. 29 
Practically speaking, even the largest ISPs need to rely on the network reach and 
customer accessibility provided by other ISPs.  But unlike the large Tier-1 ISPs who agree to 
handle the traffic of other similarly situated ISPs on a zero cost basis, small and remotely located 
ISPs become clients and resellers of the network services provided by large ISPs.  This may 
appear unfair in light of “democratic” telecommunications line cost sharing arrangements, but 
the Internet operates largely free of rate regulation and other forms of government oversight.  
Tier-1 ISPs typically can require smaller carriers to pay for network access, but on the other hand 
 
29 For an assessment of self provisioning financial impact on Australian ISPs see John 
Hibbard, John de Ridder, Dr. George R. Barker and Professor Rob Frieden, International Internet 
Connectivity and its Impact on Australia, Final Report on an Investigation for the Department of 




the smaller ISPs do have a number of Tier-1 ISP network options.  With payment for access 
smaller ISPs not only have access to a Tier-1 ISP’s subscribers, but also the content available 
from these subscribers and also the network access the Tier-1 ISP itself has secured from other 
ISPs typically located throughout the world. 
Some would argue that market-based Internet access achieves an efficient outcome while 
creating incentives for ISPs to continue building out and expanding networks.  But on the other 
hand a disproportionate financial burden foisted on the poorest ISPs and their subscribers has the 
potential to exacerbate the “digital divide” which separates people with easy and robust ICE 
access opportunities and those without. 30 
Current Marketplace Conditions Affecting Peering/Transit Decision-making 
 The process by which an ISP qualifies for peering as opposed to having to pay for 
peering or transit services, remains largely private.  ISPs negotiate terms and conditions and few 
offer public disclosure of the criteria used to qualify for peering.  Likewise the final negotiated 
agreement falls under comprehensive nondisclosure agreements making a forensic examination 
quite difficult. 
 However, several Tier-2 ISPs have posted on their World Wide Web sites general 
qualifications for its agreement to peer. 31 Having now merged with AT&T, SBC’s peering 
 
30 See, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Regulatory Reform 
as a Tool for Bridging the Digital Divide (2004); available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/11/34487084.pdf.
31 For current peering requirements, see, e.g., MCI, MAE Peering, How to Connect to the 
MAE Network; available at: http://www.mae.net/peer/howToConnect.htm;
SBC Corp., SBC Internet Services Peering Information; available at: 
http://www.sbcbackbone.net/peering/; Club Internet, T-Online France, Public Peering 
Information and Private Network Interconnection Guidelines; available at: http://www.club-
internet.fr/Peering/. New Zealand Internet Exchanges, Terms and Conditions for ExchangeNET 
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requirements offer the best available snapshot of the typical prerequisites for securing domestic 
U.S. peering agreements.  AT&T requires the following of peering candidates: 
 1. For domestic ISPs coast-to-coast nationwide OC-12 or larger public IP backbone  
 network.  
 2. Presence at three or more public peering points listed above (at least one on the  
 East Coast, one on the West Coast, and one in the Mid West) for domestic ISPs.  
 3. Presence at two or more public peering points listed above for International ISPs.  
 4. A total minimum busy hour traffic exchange of 25 Mbps with SBC Internet’s  
 Autonomous System Numbers will be required.  
 5. Must not have been an IP transit customer of SBC Internet in the past six (6)  
 months.  
 6. Willingness to enter into a Bilateral Interconnection Agreement and Non-  
 Disclosure Agreement with SBC Internet.  
 7. Operation of a 24x7x365 Network Operations Center (NOC) that proactively  
 monitors all peering connections and provides an escalation path to quickly  
 identify and resolve network problems.  
 8. No requirement for a balanced traffic exchange ratio due primarily to the   
 asymmetric nature of current broadband metallic transmission systems such as  
 ADSL and cable modems and of current Internet Data Centers.  
 9. Joint capacity planning reviews for interconnection augmentation to   
 accommodate traffic growth and minimize the possibility of latency or packet loss 
 between both networks.  
 10. Consistent routes announcements at all public peering points. 
 
Customers; available at: http://nzix.net/terms.html; Vienna University Computer Center, Internet 
Peering Agreement; available at: http://www.vix.at/vix-aconet-pa.doc; U-Net Peering Policy; 
available at: http://www.u-net.net/about/peering.htm; IP Exchange, Internet Peering Agreement; 
available at: http://peering.ip-exchange.de/peering_agreement_ipx_english.pdf; Equinex, How to 
Peer with Equinix; available at:  https://ecc.equinix.com/peering/how.htm.
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The AT&T peering criteria provide insight on current market conditions in a number a 
ways.  First, the appearance of a publicly available set of criteria evidence some move toward 
transparency in the process.  Second, the criteria, while onerous, probably represents a more 
liberal set of requirements than what an incumbent Tier-1 ISP would require.  Third, the relative 
openness of AT&T’s peering availability implies that more peering opportunities have arisen for 
ISPs willing to enter into agreements with the second tier at public peering points, even as many 
Tier-1 ISPs, ostensibly on quality of service grounds, have opted to avoid public peering. 
Traditional End User Payment Models 
 
Telephone companies traditionally have charged customers for long distance services on 
a usage sensitive basis, i.e., a minutes of use, but have offered most wireline local service options 
on an umetered basis.  Before regulatory policies favored averaging and “integrating” 32 the costs 
of long distance particularly to blunt the higher cost of serving, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, and rural locales telephone companies priced long distance service on the 
basis of mileage, or bands of distances. 33 Most telephone subscribers continue to pay for long 
 
32 See Integration of Rates and Services for the Provision of Communications by 
Authorized Common Carriers between the Contiguous States and Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands, Final Recommended Decision, 9 FCC Rcd. 2197, 2198 n.2 (1993) 
(“‘Rate integration’ is the Commission policy that was adopted to describe service between the 
contiguous states and Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands (noncontiguous points) 
at rates that are equivalent to those prevailing for comparable distances in the contiguous 48 
states.”).  
33 Section 254(g) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(g)(2005) 
codified prior FCC rate averaging policy: “Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the 
Commission shall adopt rules to require that the rates charged by providers of interexchange 
telecommunications services to subscribers in rural and high cost areas shall be no higher than 
the rates charged by each such provider to its subscribers in urban areas. Such rules shall also 
require that a provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services shall provide 
such services to its subscribers in each State at rates no higher than the rates charged to its 
subscribers in any other State.”   
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distance telephone service on a per minute basis, but carriers now have “postalized” rates so that 
customer typically pay a fixed rate, regardless of distance, much like fixed postal rates for letters 
whether sent across town or across the nation. 34 
Recently telephone companies have offered unmetered AYCE long distance calling 
subscriptions primarily in response to such options available from VoIP ventures and the fact 
that many mobile telephone carriers offer customers the option of using available minutes for 
“free” long distance calling.  In addition to competitive necessity, significant reductions in 
interconnection charges make it possible for carriers to offer unlimited local and long distance 
calling options. 
 ISPs historically have offered customers AYCE service.  ISPs first provided Internet 
access using local business lines that themselves may not have been metered by local exchange 
carriers.  Additionally it appears that customers expected Internet access to match the available 
unmetered local calling options, notwithstanding the fact that the local call usually 
interconnected with a long haul routing to reach distant sources of Internet content. 
 Most ISPs initially offered a “one size fits all” dialup access.  As broadband access 
options became available, via Digital Subscriber Links 35 and cable modems, ISPs differentiated 
 
34 Implicit subsidies in telecommunications “result, in large part from rate averaging 
between rural and suburban/urban areas and the recovery of certain non-traffic sensitive costs 
through traffic sensitive per minute rates, which over-recovers costs from higher volume users, 
often business customers.” Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 01-338, 2003 WL 22175730, at *17078 n.509 (F.C.C. 
Aug. 21, 2003); see generally Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local 
Exchange Carriers, Low-Volume Long Distance Users, Federal-State Joint Board On Universal 
Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,962, 12,971-72 (2002) (CALLS Order) (describing how high-volume 
users bear a greater share of the non-traffic sensitive costs than low-volume users), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, and remanded in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Fed. 
Communications Comm'n, 265 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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service based on the throughput customers generally could expect to receive.  ISPs now offer 
services analogous to an airline’s first class, business class and economy seating based on the bit 
rate speed for downloading and uploading content.  Few observers would consider providing 
different bit rates and service price points unreasonable discrimination as opposed to reasonable 
product differentiation. 
Reshaping the Internet Using the Bellhead Model 
 Incumbent telecommunications carriers, such as AT&T, Verizon, BellSouth and Qwest, 
in the United States, own and operate many of the major, Tier-1 ISPs that have a significant 
market share. 36 In the European Union and other nations former monopoly local and long 
distance telephone companies, such as NTT Corporation, British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, 
and Singtel, also have a dominant market share.   The merger activities of telecommunications 
carriers includes the acquisition of major Internet infrastructure operators, including networks 
previously operated independently by MCI, AT&T, GTE, BBN, Worldcom, MFS 
Communications, UUNet, and Verio. 
 
35 Bell Atlantic, now known as Verizon, described its digital subscriber line service as “an 
interstate data special access service that provides a high speed access connection between an 
end user subscriber and an Internet Service Provider (ISP) by utilizing a combination of the 
subscriber's existing local exchange physical plant (i.e. copper facility), a specialized DSL-
equipped wire center, and transport to the Asynchronous Transfer Mode Cell Relay Service 
where the ISP will connect to Bell Atlantic’s network.” Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies, CC 
Docket No. 98-168, Tariff No. 1, Transmittal No. 1081, Order, DA 98-1988, 13 FCC Rcd. 18911 
(1998). 
 
36 One credible list of the Tier-1 ISPs includes: AOL-Time Warner, AT&T, Global 
Crossing, Level 3, Verizon Business, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, Qwest, Savvis and 
Sprint Nextel Corporation.  Wikipedia, List of Tier 1 ISPs, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_carrier.
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The senior managers of incumbent telecommunications carriers have the ability and 
apparently now the interest to manage the Internet.  The ability lies in the carriers’ market share 
and ownership of major Tier-1 ISPs.  The interest largely stems from the need to establish new 
profit centers as traditional telephony becomes less profitable and incumbent carrier market 
shares decline.  Incumbent carriers have made sizeable investments in network upgrades to 
provide broadband services and having targeted customers with a “triple-“ or “quadruple-play” 
bundles of wireline and wireless telephony, video programming and Internet access.  Having 
seen the massive rise in capitalization accrued by some Internet content and service providers, 
such as Google, incumbent carriers also want upward trajectory in their stock price and revenue 
streams.   
Some of the major broadband network operators believe the best way to achieve this goal 
involves partitioning network bandwidth and prioritizing bitstreams by offering different quality 
of service guarantees.  To some observers this strategy constitutes a form of service 
discrimination that violates a longstanding tradition of network neutrality in the switching, 
routing and transmission of Internet traffic.   Since its inception the Internet has operated as a 
seamlessly interconnected collection of networks whose operators typically agree to handle the  
traffic of other operators on a “best efforts” basis. 37 Opponents of compulsory neutrality claim 
that they have no legal obligation to operate as common carriers 38 and that their interconnection 
 
37 “The Internet is a vast network of individual computers and computer networks that 
communicate with each other using the same communications language, Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The Internet consists of approximately more than 100 
million computers around the world using TCP/IP protocols. Along with the development of 
TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the following characteristics or 
parameters:1. Each distinct network stands on its own with its own specific environment and 
user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP to connect to other parts of the Internet. 
Communications are not directed in a unilateral fashion. Rather, communications are routed 
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arrangements result from commercial necessity and heretofore have achieved ample connectivity 
with plenty of routing options available to all operators.  The option of offering a “better than 
best efforts” level of service provides a means for consumers and carriers to secure and pay for 
premium service, if so desired.  
Replacing best efforts with variable quality of service (“QOS”) offers and AYCE Internet 
access with metered service imposes traditional telephony interconnection, cost recovery and 
consumer marketing strategies.   The value proposition currently enjoyed by consumers will 
change and may decline should incumbent carriers succeed in migrating users to pricing 
arrangements and service plans that incorporate these strategies.  Advocates for pricing, 
interconnection and QOS flexibility characterize the initiative as lawful price discrimination that 
can offer consumers greater flexibility and possibly lower bills for low volume users.  Net 
 
throughout the Internet on a best efforts basis in which some packets of information may go 
through one series of computer networks and other packets of information go through a different 
permutation or combination of computer networks, with all of these information packets 
eventually arriving at their intended destination. 2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect 
the various networks; these boxes are called ‘gateways’ and ‘routers.’ The gateways and routers 
do not retain information but merely provide access and flow for the packets being transmitted.3. 
There is no global control of the Internet.” Konrad L. Trope, Voice Over Internet Protocol: The 
Revolution in America’s Telecommunications Infrastructure, 22 COMP. & INTERNET L. 1. No. 
12, 1,4 (Dec. 2005). 
 
38 Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §201 et seq. requires 
common carriers to offer rate regulated, cost-based service to the public on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. “Common carrier legislation and regulation were initially intended to cover wired 
telecommunications services. Telephone and telegraph communications were perceived as a 
‘natural monopoly’ early in the twentieth century. Because of the prohibitive cost of building a 
wired telephone or telegraph network combined with the desire to provide ‘universal service’ to 
consumers, the government's original legislative and regulatory approach was to foster and 
protect AT&T's monopoly in telephone wires, switches, and services.” Jessica Finley, 
Anticipating Regulation of New Telecommunications Technologies: An Argument for the 
European Model, 26 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS 447, 450 (Winter, 2006). 
29
neutrality advocates see the initiative as an attempt to legitimize network bias, bit discrimination 
and fragmentation of the Internet into different service levels and brands.   
Regardless of the private and commercial nature of the currently constituted Internet, 
advocates for network neutrality emphasize the positive networking effects of a collective and 
unbalkanized system.  If major ISPs can freely block and degrade specific traffic streams, net 
neutrality advocates warn of societal losses as the Internet becomes a more expensive and less 
serendipitous experience.  Net bias advocates scoff at such global pronouncements and offer 
their view that combining plain vanilla routing with superior service offers options no different 
than the multiple classes of service provided by most airlines, or the qualitative difference 
between free and toll highways. 
What Is Network Neutrality? 
Advocates for network neutrality in the United States and elsewhere have called upon 
NRAs and legislatures to ensure that ISPs cannot discriminate against, or favor specific 
bitstreams.  They believe this network neutrality principle should apply both upstream to other 
ISPs, or downstream to other ISPs and in turn the treatment of end users.  Net neutrality 
advocates believe that the Internet has contributed to national productivity, economic opportunity 
and innovation in light of its nondiscriminatory, end-to-end connectivity.   
Many net neutrality advocates speak and write in apocalyptic terms that allowing price 
and service discrimination will eviscerate the Internet and enable carriers to delay or shut out 
competitors and ventures unwilling or unable to pay surcharges.  The head of a consumer group 
claims that incumbent telephone and cable companies’ can reshape the nation’s digital destiny by 
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branding the Internet and foreclosing much of its societal and cultural benefits. 39 Net bias 
advocates, emphasize that ISPs should have unfettered pricing freedom which has promoted 
innovation, risk tasking and diverse services and features. 40 
Few advocates for net neutrality have articulated what, if any, pricing, interconnection 
and QOS discrimination they believe can occur without defeating the goal of neutrality.  Two 
academic analysts, generally in favor of network neutrality, or at least no major impediments to 
end-to-end connectivity, have offered two concessions to carrier operational flexibility.  
Professor Lawrence Lessig differentiates between ISP pricing strategies that auction off lanes of 
broadband service by tiering access between content sources and users and ISPs who offer end 
users different throughput speeds or permissible volume of traffic. 41 Access-tiering violates 
Professor Lessig’s sense of network neutrality, because it would weaken competition for Internet 
services and the potential for continuing growth by erecting additional financial barriers to entry 
by innovators unable to pay the surcharges demanded by major network operators.  Professor 
Lessig considers consumer-tiering a permissible strategy by network operators to recoup 
infrastructure investments and to create necessary incentives for more investment even though it 
 
39 See Jeff Chester, The End of the Internet?, THE NATION (posted Feb. 1, 2006); 
available at: www.thenation.com/doc/20060213/chester.
40 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Neutering the net, FINANCIAL TIMES, FT.com Online, 
posted March 20, 2006; available at: http://news.ft.com/cms/s/392ad708-b837-11da-bfc5-
0000779e2340.html; Testimony of J. Gregory Sidak, United States Senate, Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation (Feb. 7, 20060); available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/sidak-020706.pdf.
41 Lawrence Lessig, Prepared Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, Hearing on “Network Neutrality” (Feb 7, 2006); available at: 
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf.
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probably would result in changing the consumer value proposition by helping network operators 
extract higher revenues particularly from large volume, “power” users. 
Professor Ed Felten distills network discrimination in terms of whether an ISP drops 
packets of a content provider based on operational necessity or deliberate degradation of  
service. 42 Minimal dropping of packets normally occurs in peering and transiting when an ISP’s 
best efforts cannot accommodate the current volume of traffic.  Absent a strategy to prioritize 
packets, the Internet Protocol and the contracts executed between ISPs calls for first come, first 
served processing.  Non-minimal dropping of packets would occur when an ISP prioritizes 
packets in such as ways as to trigger delays and lost packets even in the absence of congestion.   
In Professor Felten’s dichotomy of packet dropping, network bias occurs when an ISP 
partitions its networks in such a way as to all but guarantee that non-priority bitstreams 
experience lost packets and degradation of service quality even when it is possible for the ISP to 
avoid dropping any packets.  When dropping packets occurs even during uncongested conditions 
an ISP engages in anticompetitive discrimination, because the ISP deliberately degrades service, 
not to accommodate a priority customer, but to punish a low paying one.  Permissible net bias 
occurs when an ISP  carves out a portion of the its network to create a virtual, stand alone 
network.  This off network design provides something akin to an intranet, i.e., a partioned 
network available to single corporate client or group of customers.  However, the intranet may be 
virtual in nature and designed primarily to guarantee two dichotomous routing experiences based 
on price: near certain real time delivery of packets without loss and near certain packet dropping.   
 
42 Professor Edward Felten, Freedom to Tinker Blog, Nuts and Bolts of Net Discrimination, 
March 2, 2006; available at: http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=983
Nuts and Bolts of Net Discrimination, Part 2 (March 7, 2006); available at: http://www.freedom-
to-tinker.com/?p=986.
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The FCC’s Four Network Freedoms  
 Over several years the FCC has aggressively sought to free carriers providing Internet 
access of any significant regulatory responsibilities that apply to telecommunications service 
providers.  The Internet has flourished in part due to a “hands off” approach by governments and 
the willingness of network operators to make increasing investments in the infrastructure needed 
to transport the bits that correspond to commercially successful content and services.  As the 
Internet becomes a conduit for most converged services, the ventures operating bit transmission 
networks must make additional, substantial investments to handle growing Internet traffic along 
with new traffic streams that include full motion video.   
At the vigorous urging of incumbent carriers, the FCC has perceived the need to create 
more incentives for carriers to make broadband investments.  The Commission has largely 
dismantled compulsory access requirements and the use of mandatory pricing model that forces 
incumbent carriers to offer network elements 43 at rates well below what the carriers consider 
 
43 “Local loop unbundling (LLU) is a potentially important option that could allow 
competitors to use unbundled elements or unbundled services of . . . [the incumbent’s] access 
network to provide alternative telephone or broadband access services to end-users.  Most OECD 
countries require unbundling, including the US, Canada, UK and Australia.  Unbundling can 
create incentives for new investment in broadband access and drive faster deployment of 
broadband services because it allows less costly access to consumers for alternative broadband 
service providers.  Vigorous competition can be expected to drive prices down towards cost.” 
New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, (May 5, 2004), Report on commerce 
commission’s local loop and fixed PDN unbundling investigation, File BTP/1/TCOMP/11;  
available at: http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/telecom/llu-investigation/ministry-report/ministry-
report.pdf; See also, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, ¶  10 (1996), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); on remand,
Iowa Utils. Bd., v. FCC. 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000); affirmed in part and rev’d in part, Verizon 
Comms., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002); see also, Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report and 
Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696, 16 FCC Rcd. 
1724 (1999); reversed and remanded, United States Telecom. Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. 
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cost-based, or what they would demand in arm’s length negotiations. 44 Additionally the FCC has 
eliminated traditional common carrier regulatory burdens for carriers providing Internet access 
and services, even ones such as DSL that use “legacy” technologies, such as the copper wire, 
local loop that provided the conduit for regulated services. 45 Collectively these deregulatory 
 
Cir. 2002); see also, Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 22781 (2001); Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98- 147, Report and Order and 
Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978 (2003), 
corrected by Errata, 18 FCC Rcd 19020 (2003), vacated and remanded in part, affirmed in part,
United States Telecom Ass=n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), on remand, Unbundled 
Access to Network Elements, Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 04-313, CC Docket No. 01-338, Order on Remand, 20 
FCC Rcd. 2533 (2005). 
 
44 The FCC has required incumbent local exchange carriers to offer competitor access to 
network facilities and services on the basis of a Total Element Long Run Incremental cost 
analysis.  “TELRIC obliges both incumbents and state regulators to set prices based on the 
long-run costs that would be incurred to produce the services in question using the most-efficient 
telecommunications technology now available, and the most efficient network configuration. 
Incumbents that have aging and inefficient equipment thus must sell for less than their historical 
cost; the old system that calculated rates based on actual cost of equipment plus a reasonable rate 
of return on capital is out the window.” AT&T Communications of Illinois, v. Illinois Bell 
Telephone Co. 349 F.3d 402, 405 (7th. Cir. 2002).  The FCC expects to eliminate or reduce the 
application of TELRIC pricing.  See Review of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Pricing of 
Unbundled Network Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 
WC Docket No. 03-173, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 18945 (2003). 
 
45 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 
CC Docket No. 02-33, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 05-150, 
2005 WL 2347773 (rel. Sep. 23, 2005); available at: 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150A1.doc; see also, National Cable 
& Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) affirming 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet 
Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the 
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initiatives have freed incumbent carriers of having to share and interconnect facilities providing 
information services, or to provide these facilities on a nondiscriminatory and rate regulated 
basis. 
In light of such deregulatory fervor it comes as somewhat of a surprise to see the FCC 
weigh in on the network neutrality debate at all.  In a non-binding, non-compulsory Policy 
Statement the FCC has articulated four “principles”:  
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice;  
 
(2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of their choice, subject to the 
needs of law enforcement;  
 
(3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the 
network; and  
 
(4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and 
service providers, and content providers.  46 
The FCC’s four Network Freedoms appear noncontroversial, but they have no impact on 
the pricing, interconnection and QOS differentiation under their current status as policy 
objectives.  However, the Commission has intervened where a wireline telephone company 
deliberately blocked—as opposed to degraded—VoIP traffic terminations.  In Madison River 
Communications, LLC 47 the Commission fined a telephone company and ordered it not to block 
VoIP traffic terminations. Arguably the consumer entitlement to competition among software 
 
Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185 & CS Docket No. 02-52, Declaratory 
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 4798 (2002). 
 
46 United States Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, FCC Adopts Policy 
Statement (Aug. 5, 2005); available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
260435A1.doc.
47 Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, DA 05-543, 20 FCC Rcd 4295 (2005),   
available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A1.pdf.
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application providers, such as VoIP ventures, means that the Commission considers network 
neutrality a viable concept at least where compulsory common carriage responsibilities continue 
to apply as in the case with local wireline telephone companies. 
Whether and When Network Neutrality Principles and Possibly Regulations Are Necessary 
 
Advocates for network neutrality appropriately note the synergy and serendipity achieved 
when the Internet operates as a network of networks and offers consumers seamless, global 
connectivity based on best efforts routing and reciprocal carriage agreements among ISPs.  
Consumers enjoy an incredible value proposition when they can access the Internet on an 
unmetered, AYCE basis and acquire attractive content subsidized by advertisers who can exploit 
the AYCE subscription option by adding to the downloaded packet payload.  The high value 
proposition offered to consumers jibes with the Nethead philosophy about making the Internet 
ubiquitous with more emphasis on connectivity and with less regard for cost recovery and 
analysis of cost causation. 
 Netheads helped create the Internet and the initial reciprocal, zero payment peering 
models.  At the Internet’s inception, Netheads could emphasize connectivity over cost, because 
governments sponsored incubation efforts as both underwriters and anchor tenants.  As 
governments have largely eliminated their financial sponsorship and as Bellhead-dominated 
telecommunications carriers seek to recoup their Internet investment, cost causation and cost 
recovery have become substantially more important.   
The net neutrality versus net bias debate focuses on what strategies and tactics in 
accounting for costs and recovering them are reasonable and fair versus anticompetitive and 
unjustified.  Unreasonable net bias occurs when an ISP pursues a discrimination strategy against 
a specific type of bitstream or generator of a bitstream without a reasonable and fair minded 
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financial or operational justification.  ISPs can and should drop packets based on congestion and 
the inability to route bits.  Net bias occurs when an ISP drops packets or denies access—even 
when contractually obligated to provide it—based on artificially induced conditions that simulate 
congestion, despite the fact that ample capacity exists to switch and route the traffic. 
Net bias does not occur simply when ISPs elect to offer end users different throughput 
speeds and even a daily or monthly quota of permissible throughput.  Likewise net bias does not 
occur when an ISP negotiates different interconnection and access arrangements with upstream 
peers and clients.  Net bias does not even occur when an ISP deliberately partitions bandwidth so 
that a “private” or premium routing option exists.  However, net bias does occur when an ISP 
engages in tactics designed to render “public” peering and transit routes congested unreliable, or 
blocked despite the fact that ample, unpartitioned capacity to switch and route the traffic remains 
available.  
Permissible Network Bias 
 Advocates for network flexibility correctly state that external, non-market driven 
constraints on their ability to price discriminate can adversely impact their incentive to invest in 
broadband infrastructure and their ability to recoup that investment.  ISPs have avoided common 
carrier responsibilities and the Internet largely functions as a product of countless 
interconnection arrangements flexibly negotiated and executed free of government oversight.  
ISPs correctly note that only in rare instances has an interconnection dispute triggered allegations 
37
of anticompetitive practices and rarely if ever has a consumer lost access to a content source or 
addressee as a result of network inaccessibility or balkanization.  48
Variable Bandwidth and Throughput 
 Network flexibility in pricing, service provisioning and QOS makes economic sense and 
does not violate a reasonable expectation of network neutrality.  ISPs should have the option of 
offering end users, peers and transit clients options as to the amount of available throughput.  
Just as airlines offer first, business, and economy seating and car drivers have free and toll 
highway options, Internet consumers should have access to different Internet experiences.  
Variable throughput options already exist upstream from end users to peers and transit clients 
who reciprocate with connectivity at a specified bandwidth, or pay for a specific amount of 
connectivity.  
Bandwidth Partitioning  
 Absent contractual commitments with peers and transit clients to provide a specific level 
of service and throughput, an ISP also should have the option of partitioning its available 
bandwidth.  Partitioning enables a facilities-based ISP to meet different levels of peering 
requirements as well as to offer transit clients different amounts of throughput.  If an ISP can 
engineer a complete route, whether via its own facilities, or network capacity allocated to it by 
another carrier, the ISP can offer end-to-end, QOS performance guarantees at a premium price.  
 Partitioning constitutes legitimate price and quality discrimination, even if the remaining 
public, non-premium throughout declines.  Net bias occurs if and only if the ISP deliberately 
 
48 Threats of “depeering” occasionally occurs as do temporary denials of service. See, e.g.,
Level 3 depeers Cogent, THE REGISTER, Oct. 6, 2005; available at: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/06/level3_cogent/.
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degrades service on public peering and transit links, despite ample “public network” capacity to 
offer uncongested switching, routing and packet transmission. 
Metered Service 
 ISPs do not violate a reasonable sense of net neutrality by migrating consumers to  
metered Internet access.  While metering would reduce the value proposition to consumers 
Internet AYCE access should not be a government mandated right.  Metering satisfies the 
Bellhead quest for cost attribution and recovery and surely would force consumers to rethink 
their usage patterns and tolerance for unsolicited content, the core financial model for 
subsidizing consumer access to desired content.   
Metering and caps on throughput might create new and possibly lower price points for 
occasional users.  However, the Bellhead experience with local wireline, plain old telephone 
service and many types of wireless packages confirm that few consumers like having to think 
about the number of calls they make and their minutes of use.   
Better Than Best Efforts Routing 
 Despite a Nethead heritage of a one size fits all Internet, ISPs already have diversified the 
terms and conditions under which they switch, route and transport the packets generated by a 
third party content provider, or another ISP.  Better than best efforts routing is not a 
contradiction, or unreasonable discrimination against content generators, consumers or ISPs that 
elect not to pay for superior treatment.  However an ISP may not unilaterally change the terms of 




Impermissible Net Bias 
Deliberate Packet Loss 
 Probably the most troubling scenarios of unfettered network bias lies in the potential for 
seemingly legitimate QOS, interconnection and pricing discrimination to obscure, unfair trade- 
and anticompetitive practices.  The Internet Protocol has a built in system for managing 
congestion, but ISPs appear to have the ability to create or simulate congestion and the necessity 
for dropping packets when no real congestion takes place.  False congestion 49 to punish, 
discipline or competitively outmaneuver competitors, or customers refusing to pay newly 
imposed surcharges, appears the same as the manufacture of congestion by energy traders 
employed by Enron keen on artificially raising prices. 50
Existing peering and transit agreements may lack a specific prohibition of deliberate 
packet loss, based on the presumption that best efforts routing implies nondiscrimination.  
Because ISPs in the future may have the option of offering biased and discriminatory network 
routing, regulatory or judicial remedies may be needed to foreclose and punish deliberate 
 
49 ISPs surely should have the option of offering a premium peak service that would offer 
higher likelihood of undropped packets and timely delivery even under truly congested 
conditions. See, Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion,
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER 
05-28 (2005); available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=825669.
50 “So Enron was also responsible for some of California's power crisis! What was then a 
profoundly corrupt enterprise manipulated the Golden State's power market to help create 
artificial shortages that would jack up prices. A particularly repellent example of this enterprise 
was Enron's so-called Death Star strategy, which, as a company memo put it, let Enron be paid 
‘for moving energy to relieve congestion without actually moving any energy or relieving any 
congestion.’ In one case, Enron bought power in California at a capped price of $250 a megawatt 
hour and resold it in Oregon for $2,500. The company also “laundered” electricity to avoid 
federal price caps.” Providence Journal-Bulletin (May 22, 2002) (retrived from Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Universe). 
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degradation of service, particularly when packet loss and other strategies are directed at specific 
content providers. 
Targeting Large Volume Content Generators for Punishment or Extortion 
 Several senior managers of incumbent telecommunications carriers have derided high 
volume content generators, such as Google, as free riders of the carriers’ broadband  
networks. 51 Even as these managers threaten retaliation, one representative has labeled as 
“chicken littles” 52 articulated concerns about the adverse impact of a tiered Internet, these very 
same leaders have all but threatened to abuse the bits generated by large content generators.  53
51 Marguerite Reardon, Cnet, News of Change,Qwest CEO Supports Tiered Internet (March 
15, 2006); available at:  http://news.com.com/Qwest+CEO+supports+tiered+Internet/2100-
1034_3-6050109.html?tag=nl [hereinafter cited as Qwest comments]; “William L. Smith, chief 
technology officer for Atlanta-based BellSouth Corp., told reporters and analysts that an Internet 
service provider such as his firm should be able, for example, to charge Yahoo Inc. for the 
opportunity to have its search site load faster than that of Google Inc.” Jonathan Krim, Executive 
Wants to Charge for Web Speed Some Say Small Firms Could Be Shut Out of Market 
Championed by BellSouth Officer, WASHINGTON POST, December 1, 2005; Page D05; 
available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113002109.html;
cf. BellSouth Media Room, Net Neutrality Overview; available at 
http://bellsouth.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_kit&item=74; Arshad Mohammed, Verizon 
Executive Calls for End to Google’s “Free Lunch,” WASHINGTON POST, February 7, 2006; 
Page D01; available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020601624.html.
52 “‘We believe in finding a commercial solution to this issue. The marketplace has tools to 
sort this out,’ said Whitacre in response to those calling for legislated Net neutrality. Comparing 
those who call for legislation to Chicken Little, Whitacre argued that service providers do not 
need Congress to tell them how best to run their businesses.” Pete Comas, Whitacre Calls for 
Less Regulation, VOIP MAGAZINE, March 21, 2006; available at: http://www.voip-
magazine.com/content/view/2512/.
53 One knowledgeable industry analyst deems this strategy extortion: “I think it’s probably 
true that companies are coming to Qwest willing to pay for better treatment on their network," he 
said. “But I think they’re doing it out of fear. It’s legalized extortion.” Qwest Comments (quoting 
Jeff Pulver, CEO of Pulver.com. 
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Incumbent carriers have presented quite a mixed message.  On hand they have achieved 
incredible deregulatory success by representing the robustly competitive nature of the broadband 
Internet access marketplace.  This environment does not yet exist in light of the current 99.4% 
market share the FCC itself has calculated for cable modem and DSL access. 54 Nevertheless the 
presumption of robust competition emboldens the incumbent carriers to portray themselves as 
victims of thievery by the likes of Google, E-bay and Yahoo.   
On the other hand these very carriers have threatened to engage in practices that comes 
across as traditional monopolist responses to incipient competition.  True to its Bell System  
heritage incumbent telecommunications firms imply the ability and willingness to employ 
anticompetitive interconnection, QOS and access pricing strategies.  Threats of surcharges or 
degraded service imply that incumbent carrier managers may still operate with a Bellhead 
orientation that they can continue to manage a bottleneck, engage in margin squeezes, 55 readily 
 
54 The FCC reported that as of December 31, 2005, cable television companies provided 
62.4% of broadband high speed services in the United States with telephone companies 
providing 37%.  Federal Communications Commission, High Speed Services for Internet Access: 
Status as of December 31, 2005 (rel. July 26, 2006); available at: 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-266596A1.pdf
With rare exception one cable television company and one telephone company offer broadband 
services in any locality meaning that 99.4% of the primary next generation networks are 
provided by two largely unregulated operators in any single locality. 
 
55 A margin price squeeze “refers to situations in which a vertically-integrated dominant 
firm uses its control over an input supplied to downstream rivals to prevent them from making a 
profit on a downstream market in which the dominant firm is also active. The dominant firm 
could in theory do this in a number of different ways. It could raise the input price to levels at 
which rivals could no longer sustain a profit downstream. Alternatively, it could engage in 
below-cost selling in the downstream market, while maintaining a profit overall through the sale 
of the upstream input. Finally, the dominant firm could raise the price of the upstream input and 
lower the price of the downstream retail create a margin between them at which a rival would not 
be profitable.” Damien Geradin and Robert O'Donoghue, The Concurrent Application of 
Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the 
Telecommunications Sector, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 355,357-58 (June, 2005).  
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meter network use and discriminate between similarly situated traffic streams.  Innovations in bit 
and packet sniffing do provide the opportunity to discriminate by type of service, e.g., video 
versus email, type of network user, e.g., transit for the customer of another ISP, or delivery for a 
customer, type of packet, e.g., content generated by one unwilling to pay a surcharge, or content 
generated by one willing to pay a surcharge.  Only time will tell whether incumbent carriers 
pursue lawful price and service discrimination, or unlawful practices. 
 Rather than threaten lawful or unlawful retaliation through delayed, degraded and 
dropped packets, incumbent carriers should market a superior Internet experience for high 
volume content generators and their customers.  Because incumbent carriers and their ISP 
affiliates may not have a direct peering or transit agreement, these ventures may lack privity of 
contract with companies such as Google.  Rather than alienate them with threats, incumbent 
operators should come up with marketing strategies to entice these attractive prospects customers 
to become customers.  In any event both end user serving ISPs and upstream operators should 
face an explicit prohibition on content provider specific QOS and packet degradation and 
discrimination. 
Port Blocking 
 Even the FCC appears to agree that an ISP cannot single out a specific lawful user of the 
ISP’s network and deny service to that user.  When an ISP agrees to peer with another ISP, or to 
provide transit service over a number of “advertised routes” the ISP has contractually committed 
to carry any and all packets from the other ISP regardless of the identity and marketplace success 
of the other ISP’s customers.  The peering or transit providing ISP may demand more 
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compensation, or the reciprocal expansion of throughput from other ISPs.  However, the ISP 
should have no lawful opportunity to deny onward packet transmission to specific customers of 
other ISPs, or specific types of traffic generated by the customers of other ISPs. 
 Port blocking involves the conscious decision by one ISP to deny onward transmission of 
traffic, or delivery of traffic to an intended recipient.  An ISP engaged in port blocking might 
determine that most VoIP traffic destined for a final recipient traverses one specific routing.  An 
ISP keen on blocking VoIP, perhaps to shelter an access charge payment revenue stream 
accruing to an affiliated telephone company, might block the known routing configuration for 
unaffiliated VoIP operators.  The Madison River company pursued this strategy and the FCC 
fined the company.  Additionally several cable television companies allegedly have blocked 
ports, filtered IP addresses and have pursued other means to thwart or slow transit via their 
networks. 56 
The FCC could fine Madison River, because the company blocking packet delivery 
operated as a conventional, common carrier telephone company subject to Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended.  The Commission probably would have had no 
enforcement mechanism should the port blocking occur in the network of a company classified 
as providing information services, 57 including VoIP and other functional equivalents to 
 
56 See Cybertelecom, Vonage Complaint to the FCC, News; available at: 
http://www.cybertelecom.org/voip/blocking.htm.
57 Information service is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, 
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such 
capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the 
management of a telecommunications service.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).  The FCC does not apply 
common carrier regulation to information service providers under Title II of the Communications 
Act, 47 U.S.C. §201 et seq.  The Commission uses its ancillary regulatory power under Title I, 
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conventional circuit switched telephony like that provided by Madison River.  Accordingly, port 
blocking strategies should be deemed impermissible by telecommunications service providers 
and information service providers alike. 58 Where concerns about public health and safety exist, 
e.g., emergency 911 access via VoIP telephones, the FCC has refrained from relying on a 
marketplace generated remedy.  59
Unfair Trade Practices and Affiliate Favoritism   
 A telephone company and even information service providers, such as ISPs, may look to  
port blocking as a way to enhance the marketplace attractiveness of corporate affiliates, 
particularly if the carrier can obscure its tactics.  When taking advantage of technological and 
market convergence as well as deregulation ventures can vertically and horizontally integrate 
services.  Triple- and quadruple-play offers that blend wireline and wireless telephony, Internet 
services and access to video programming demonstrate that such integration can accrue 
economies of scale and scope, but they also create incentives for operators to tilt the competitive 
 
which, for example, has been invoked to require VoIP service providers to cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities regarding wiretaps and to coordinate with wireline carriers in the 
provision of emergency 911 access. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory 
Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41 (2003); James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the 
Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15 (2003). 
 
58 “Canadian customers of Rogers, Canada's largest cable ISP, have speculated for months 
that the company has begun to block access to BitTorrent as well as the downloading of podcasts 
from services such as iTunes.  While Rogers initially denied the charges, it now acknowledges 
that it uses "traffic shaping" to prioritise certain online activity. As a result, applications that 
Rogers deems to be a lower priority may cease to function effectively.” Michael Geist, Towards 
a two-tier internet, BBC NEWS, Technology (Dec. 22, 2005); available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4552138.stm.
59 See, e.g., IP-Enabled Services and E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, 
First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 10,245 (2005).  
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playing field to the advantage of corporate affiliates.  In the absence of structural separation 60 
between wireline, wireless and VoIP telephone affiliates and between information and 
 
60 Initially the FCC enthusiastically embraced structural separation as an effective way to 
ensure non-discriminatory treatment between an incumbent local exchange carrier (“ILEC”) on 
one hand and ILEC affiliates and competitors operating in markets that offer enhancements to 
basic telecommunications transmission capacity.  In the Second Computer Inquiry, the FCC 
required AT&T to provide enhanced services, which have close similarity to information 
services, only through separate subsidiaries. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's 
Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), CC Docket No. 20828, Final Decision, 77 
FCC 2d 384 (1980), on reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C. 2d 50 
(1980) and Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C. 2d 512 
(1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer and Commun. Indus. Ass’n v FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). see also Robert M. Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: 
Mapping the Communications/Information Processing Terrain, 33 FED. COMM. L. J., No. 1. 
pp. 55-115 (1981); Robert M. Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma,
38 FED. COMM. L. J., No. 3.  pp. 383-410 (1987). 
Without any actual measurement of whether structural separation caused ILECs to 
operate inefficiently or to lose operational synergies the Commission subsequently eliminated 
structural safeguards.   Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Third 
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986), on Recons., 2 FCC Rcd. 3035 
(1987), Amendment to Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 3072 (1987), 
Amendment Computer III, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Recons., 3 FCC Rcd. 
1135 (1988), Amendment Computer III, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 1150 
(1988), Amendment Computer III, Memorandum Opinion and Second Recons., 4 FCC Rcd. 
5927 (1989), rev’d California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), Computer III Remand 
Proceedings, Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 7719 (1990), Computer III Remand Proceedings, 
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telecommunications service providers, a vertically and horizontally integrated venture may be 
tempted to use packet discrimination in ways that constitute an unfair and deceptive trade 
practice. 
Premium Services or Fees to Override Firewalls and Filters 
In the rush to “monetize” Internet investments all kinds of ventures may come up with 
services that appear clever and promising before their debut.   One of the major ISPs, unaffiliated 
with an incumbent carrier, came up with such a idea: imposing a per email message surcharge in 
exchange for which the ISP would use best efforts to deliver the message regardless of whether 
the ISP’s customer sought to block and filter out such content. 61 Better than best efforts delivery 
of spam constitutes a kind of paid for bit favoritism that enriches the ISP much to the dismay and 
chagrin of the ISP’s customer if it results in the delivery of spam and other unwanted content that 
otherwise would be filtered out of view.  Such premium delivery option should occur only when 
an ISP has secured the consent of addresses to receive such content and the content provider 
agrees to pay the surcharge. 
 In this instance AOL came to the quick realization that whatever revenues it would 
generate with an email stamp or surcharge would pale in comparison to the ill will of its 
customers and the potential that they would vote with their feet and find an ISP more willing to 
respect consumer firewall and filtering preferences.  The incumbent carriers readily tout 
consumer sovereignty as sufficiently forceful to prevent anticompetitive and unfair trade 
practices.  But unlike AOL, which faces significant competition in the marketplace for providing 
 
61 Saul Hansell, Postage Is Due for Companies Sending E-Mail, (Feb. 5, 2006); available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/technology/05AOL.html?ex=1296795600&en=6efa03d0cb
face9e&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. AOL’s false start probably will not prevent ISPs 
from seeking surcharge payments from delivery of customer approved content. 
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consumers access to Internet content, facilities-based competition for first and last mile 
broadband network access lacks such competition.  Until such time as most consumers have 
viable and low cost alternatives to a cable/telephone company duopoly consumers cannot readily 
shift carriers when experiencing packet discrimination or favoritism that they do not like. 
Unilaterally Imposing Upstream and Downstream Rules That Violate Existing Service 
Level Agreements 
 
When AT&T Chairman Ed Whitacre singled out Google as a free rider, he suggested that 
his company and others should have the option to extend rules and pricing discipline over the 
customers of other carriers.  No privity of contract exists between AT&T and Google unless both 
carrier and customer have executed a service agreement.  Yet Mr. Whitacre’s comment appears 
to state the case for his company to impose rules and charge fees for customers whose traffic 
traverses AT&T as part of the complete end-to-end routing arrangement even though the AT&T 
role occurs as a result of peering and transiting contracts with other ISPs, not Google.  In other 
words, existing peering and transit agreements made by AT&T entitle Google to have its traffic 
delivered to an AT&T subscriber, or to have one or more links provided by AT&T without any 
direct payment from Google to AT&T. 
 If this comes across as unfair, consider the following justifications.  First AT&T readily 
agreed to this arrangement, because for every peering agreement where AT&T has to provide 
packet transport and delivery using its network, it receives reciprocal access to the networks of a 
peer.  Second AT&T heretofore has offered subscribers unmetered, AYCE service without 
regard to the type of bits the customer seeks and who generated the bits in the first place.  If 
AT&T were to single out Google for inferior treatment, it would violate its contractual 
commitment to its peers and transit customers who have paid for best efforts access to AT&T’s 
networks.  Additionally AT&T might violate its Service Level Agreement with customers should 
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Google bits experience extraordinarily great loses, delays and access difficulties.  Lastly AT&T 
has agreed to support global access and seamless network connectivity presumably because it 
accrues equal or greater utility, value and benefit for itself and its customers versus that accrued 
by other ISPs and their customers. 
AT&T can impose special rules on Google if and only if all intermediary carriers 
similarly agree to enforce these rules and to offer any superior network performance offered by 
AT&T.  Practically speaking AT&T may not be able to impose rules unilaterally across networks 
operated by others.  However, if it were to attempt to do so regulation may be necessary to limit 
such rule setting to instances where AT&T can engineer a complete end-to-end routing using its 
own facilities, or the facilities of other carriers that readily agree to sniff Google packets and 
offer superior service for a premium rate.  AT&T and all other ISPs should not have the option 
of seeking to engineer a deliberately inferior end-to-end routing experience for Google as a way 
to punish, or competitively disadvantage a single network user. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The debate about net neutrality has triggered emotional responses from both sides in light 
of the enormous stakes involved.  In response to relaxed regulation and the lost revenues from 
core wireline telephony incumbent carriers have embraced the Internet as the primary focal point 
for services and profits going forward.  These carriers have offered Internet access to end users at 
quite attractive, possibly subsidized rates.  Having made the infrastructure investment and having 
acquired substantial market share for the first and last mile of Internet access, incumbent carriers 
predictably want to generate more revenues by offering subscribers additional Internet-mediated 
services.  In light of a maturing Internet access marketplace, these carriers also want to eliminate 
any early market development, promotional pricing. 
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In seeking to migrate customers to traditional metered arrangements incumbent carriers 
seek to calibrate more closely wholesale and retail charges with cost causation.  But in doing so 
incumbent carriers may reduce consumers’ perceptions of the value in an Internet access 
subscription particularly if no AYCE option remains.   Incumbent carriers continue to offer 
AYCE for basic telephony, because consumers expect this option and because unmetered service 
makes economic sense when the incremental cost of an additional call triggers insignificant 
additional costs outside of peak periods of congestion.  Few telephone subscribers, even low 
volume and poor subscribers, willingly substitute a metered option for AYCE, despite the 
potential for a lower monthly bill.  
 Incumbent carriers also have failed to make a credible argument that large content 
providers have become free riders.  Content providers, such as Google, pay for direct access to 
the Internet via geographically dispersed web hosting and traffic interchange points.  It appears 
that incumbent carriers have picked the wrong fight with the wrong type of Internet user.  If the 
Internet offers ample routing diversity and carrier options, vilified content providers, such as 
Google, can vote with their dollars and secure paid peering and transit agreements with 
competitors of incumbent carriers.   
One would think incumbent carriers would want to load their facilities and recoup 
sizeable investment with Google’s traffic.  This view extends to last mile terminations of Google 
traffic, because some significant part of a consumer’s decision to pay for incumbent carrier 
provided broadband access is based on the expectation of having high speed access to content 
supplied by major Internet players such as Google, ebay, and Yahoo as well as for peer-to-peer 
networking opportunities and access to large file downloads. 
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On the other hand, net neutrality advocates may have overstated the potential for the 
demise of the Internet as we know it.  Absent port blocking and other deliberate attempts to drop 
packets or degrade traffic, much of the prospective net bias constitutes reasonable, but probably 
ill-advised price discrimination.  End-to-end connectivity does not appear at risk if incumbent 
carriers limit their net bias initiatives to changing the financial terms and conditions of service to 
end users and upstream ISPs.  Incumbent operators may have erected higher market entry costs 
for content suppliers and for new innovators and entrepreneurs, but the potential for serendipity 
available to “web surfers” should remain largely unabated.  However, should a meter replace 
AYCE many cost conscious consumers may balk at allowing their computers and network 
connection to support peer-to-peer networking, and collaborative computing ventures such as the 
search for extraterrestrial life and climate prediction projects.  62
The possibility exists for disruption of the current quid-pro-quo where consumers acquire 
access to valuable content, free of charge, in exchange for receiving additional unsolicited 
advertising.  In a metered environment, or one where consumers face bandwidth or aggregate 
throughput caps or quotas, the additional advertising payload may carve out a substantial portion 
of a subscriber’s monthly throughput allotment.  Consumers may have far less tolerance for 
unsolicited, spam emails, banner advertisements and other throughput users if the consumer 
directly bears the cost for the delivery of such traffic.   Net bias initiatives may accrue revenue 
 
62 SETI@home is a scientific experiment that uses Internet-connected computers in the 
Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (“SETI”).  Individual computer owners can participate by 
running a free program that downloads and analyzes radio telescope data thereby distributing the 
massive data analysis load among an extensive grid of participants.  See SETI@home web site, 
http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/.
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and efficiency gains for incumbent carriers at the risk of triggering a significant reduction in the 
synergy, welfare enhancement, or surplus accrued from an Internet access subscription.  
Perhaps consumer resistance to unsolicited content may cause incumbent carriers to come 
up with innovative, untraditional payment plans similar to what Netheads offer.  One option, 
used by both Netheads and quasi-Bellhead cellular radiotelephone carriers shift costs from 
content recipients to content generators.  A “pay to play,”  Calling Party Pays 63 arrangement 
would require advertisers to pay for content delivery in addition to content hosting just as calling 
parties pay for termination of calls on wireless mobile telephone networks in many countries 
with the exception of the United States.  Because paying parties may consider any surcharge as a 
double payment, from both the end user and the advertiser, incumbent carriers must offer both 
parties some service enhancements: for end users an increase in the throughput quota or bit rate, 
and for advertisers and content creators superior carriage from end-to-end, i.e., from content 
generator, through all affiliated and unaffiliated ISP networks and onward to the last mile 
operated by the incumbent carrier. 
If the privatization signaled the conclusion of the Internet’s first, developmental phase, 
then the net neutrality/net bias debate signals the conclusion of the Internet’s second, adolescent 
and experimental phase.  As the Bellheads have consolidated both ownership and management of 
 
63 “Today in the United States, the presubscribed customer of a CMRS [commercial mobile 
radio services] provider – ‘the called party’ - generally pays all charges associated with incoming 
calls. Under CPP, a CMRS provider makes available to its subscribers an offering whereby the 
party placing the call to a CMRS subscriber pays at least some of the charges associated with 
terminating the call, including most prominently charges for the CMRS airtime.” Calling Party 
Pays Service Offering in the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Declaratory Ruling and Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket No. 97-207, 14 FCC Rcd. 10,861 (1999)(proposing to  
remove regulatory obstacles to the offering to consumers of Calling Party Pays). 
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the major Tier-1 ISPs, it logically follows that their management style and operating assumptions 
similarly will predominate.  
